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INTRODUCTION
[1]
Education is one of the most important functions of the
government.1 Because public schools are under the control of state and
local authorities,2 the administrators and teachers of these schools are
subject to requirements established in the United States Constitution. For
example, for more than thirty years, the Supreme Court has supported the
due process rights3 of students facing a deprivation of liberty and property
interests in education.4

∗

J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2010; S.M., Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2004; Technical Advisor in Patent Litigation, Morrison &
Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C. This Article does not represent the views of her firm or
its clients. This article originated from a paper for a seminar taught by Adjunct Professor
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author would like to thank her mother, Cindy Ho, for providing so many opportunities to
reach for the stars.

1

See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).

2

See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 104 (1968).
3

U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

4

See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
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[2]
First Amendment5 or free speech jurisprudence has been constantly
evolving in the context of school settings.6 While the Supreme Court first
held that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”7 it later held that First
Amendment protections for students “are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.”8 This is because protections
afforded to students through the First Amendment are contorted and
limited by the special characteristics inherent in a school environment.9
Although administrators and teachers, as agents of the government, cannot
“censor similar speech outside the school,” the Court has determined that a
school does not have to “tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with
its ‘basic educational mission.’”10
[3]
Use of the Internet as a medium for students to voice their opinions
adds new “spins” in the legal analysis of student speech cases.11 While the
Supreme Court held in the landmark decision of Reno v. ACLU that
Internet speech is protected speech by the First Amendment,12 many

5

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . .”).
6

See Thomas Fischer, The Law and Education: Supreme Court Doctrine Reaches
Critical Mass, 13 MISS. C. L. REV. 287, 288-90 (1993) (discussing the evolution of
school law).
7

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

8

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).

9

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.

10

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (holding that the school
did not violate the student’s First Amendment rights by censoring his articles on the
student newspaper because it was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns)
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
11

Michael J. O’Connor, School Speech in the Internet Age: Do Students Shed Their
Rights When They Pick Up a Mouse?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 459, 477 (2009).

12

521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).

2
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questions remain with regard to cyberspace law behind schoolhouse gates.
For example, if schools may censor a lewd or substantially disruptive
student speech delivered at a school assembly or published in the school
newspaper, may schools similarly censor a lewd or substantially disruptive
student speech that occurred on the Internet?13 If so, under what
circumstance is it permissible for a school to exercise this authority, and
what standard should the court apply in adjudicating these cases? This
comment aims to address these questions.
[4]
Part I of this article reviews the three standards the U.S. Supreme
Court set out for limiting First Amendment protection of student speech.14
Part II compares the application of these three standards to two recent
student speech cases15 and argues that courts inadequately apply these preInternet legal limits to cases arising from student speech on the Internet.
Part III addresses various viewpoints on the issue of student Internet
speech and proposes a new standard for resolving such cases.
I. PRE-INTERNET STANDARDS FOR STUDENT SPEECH
[5]
Before the age of the Internet, the Supreme Court handed down
three landmark decisions regarding student speech: Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,16 Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser,17 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.18 These cases
articulate three different standards regarding student speech.

13

See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 472.

14

See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (articulating a lewdness standard); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at
276 (articulating a school curriculum standard); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (articulating a
“substantial disruption” standard).
15

See generally Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d. 1175 (E.D. Mo.
1998); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
16

393 U.S. 503.

17

478 U.S. 675.

18

484 U.S. 260.
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A. THE SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION STANDARD
[6]
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is a
landmark decision regarding student free speech.19 Tinker arose from the
suspension of three students for wearing black armbands on school
grounds in protest of the Vietnam War.20 The Court held that student
speech that interferes “materially and substantially” with a school’s ability
to educate or affects “the rights of others” was not protected by the First
Amendment.21 The Court explained, however, that a student’s right to
freedom of expression cannot be defeated by “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance” or “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”22
Noting that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students,” the Court concluded: “In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled
to freedom of expression of their views.”23
B. THE LEWDNESS STANDARD
[7]
The Supreme Court limited the liberal reach of Tinker in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.24 In Fraser, the school suspended a
student for delivering a sexually explicit speech at a school assembly.25
While the Court ultimately determined that a school may regulate a

19

See 393 U.S. at 505-06.

20

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.

21

Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)); see id. at 514
(finding the wearing of black armbands did not interfere with the school’s work or with
the rights of other students to be left alone).

22

Id. at 508-09.

23

Id. at 511.

24

See generally 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

25

Id. at 677-78.
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student speech that is vulgar or lewd,26 it cautioned that freedom to
“advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms
must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”27 This pivotal
decision gave school officials the constitutional authority to punish
students for their speech, even though that same speech, if made by an
adult, would be protected outside the school’s gates.28
C. THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM STANDARD
[8]
The Court continued to narrow the scope of Tinker in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier.29 In Kuhlmeier, two student articles were
withheld from publication in the school newspaper; one dealt with “the
impact of divorce on students at the school,” and the other discussed
“students’ experiences with pregnancy.”30
The principal withheld
publication because he thought the articles were inappropriate for younger
students and because he was concerned about the anonymity of the
students interviewed in the articles.31

26

Id. at 685-86 (holding that the school district did not violate the student’s First
Amendment rights by suspending him based on a speech he had made at a schoolsponsored event because the speech contained elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphors).
27

Id. at 681 (“Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires
consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.”). But
see id. at 692 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As the Court of Appeals noted, there “is no
evidence in the record indicating that any students found the speech to be offensive.'”)
(quoting Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1361 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985)).
28

See Carol M. Schwetschenau, Note, Constitutional Protection for Student Speech in
Public High Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986),
55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1349, 1364 (1987).

29

484 U.S. 260 (1988).

30

Id. at 263.

31

See id. at 263-64.

5

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 2

[9]
The Court held that when a newspaper is part of a school
curriculum, rather than a public forum, the content therein is subject to
greater control by school administrators and teachers,32 but any action
taken must be “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”33
Therefore, as long as these two requirements are met, educators may
exercise editorial control over the style and content of student speech
without violating the First Amendment.34
[10] The standards of substantial disruption, lewdness, and curriculum
set the stage for student Internet speech cases. Without a new and clearer
standard, these cases serve as the only guidelines for lower courts to
adjudicate student speech cases relating to the Internet.
II. CASE STUDIES: APPLICATION OF PRE-INTERNET STANDARDS TO
TWO STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH CASES
[11] In accordance with the growth of the Internet, more and more
student speech cases involve student speech that takes place on this
relatively new intangible medium. Because the Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed how the mainstream use of the Internet by students
modifies pre-Internet law, courts stick with and even reinvent the
standards of Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier. To determine whether the
First Amendment protects a student’s speech in cyberspace courts will
focus on the level of disruption caused by the student speech (Tinker), the
lewdness of student speech (Fraser), or whether the student speech is part

32

Id. at 270 (explaining that the newspaper is part of a school curriculum because it had
always been a part of the educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity). But cf.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986) (explaining that
the newspaper was a public forum “because it was intended to be and operated as a
conduit for student viewpoint,” covering topics of student interest).

33

Id. at 271.

34

Id. (explaining that activities such as “school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school . . . may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting . . .”); id. at 273.

6
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of the school curriculum (Kuhlmeier).35 Although these three standards
have set the stage for student Internet speech cases, this section argues that
a new and clearer definition of the scope of students’ freedom of speech
rights is needed by contrasting two 1998 student Internet speech cases,
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District36 and J.S. v. Bethlehem Area
School District.37
A . BEUSSINK V. WOODLAND R-IV SCHOOL DISTRICT
[12] During his senior year at Woodland High School in Missouri,
Brandon Beussink created a website on his home computer during his own
time.38 Brandon’s website was very critical of Woodland High School’s
administration,39 using “vulgar language to convey his opinion regarding
the teachers, the principal and the school’s own homepage.”40 Beyond
stating an opinion, Bandon’s website “invited readers to contact the school
principal and communicate their opinions regarding Woodland High
School.”41
[13] After a classmate, Amanda Brown, was invited to view the website
on Brandon’s home computer, the two had an argument.42 Amanda
subsequently accessed Brandon’s website at school and brought it to the
attention of a teacher, who then notified the principal.43 The principal,
35

See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash.
2000) (discussing the three standards and using them for guidance).
36

30 F. Supp.2d 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).

37

807 A.2d 847.

38

Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d. at 1177.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 1177-78.
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upset that a student had displayed Brandon’s website in a classroom,
initially suspended Brandon for five days; however, he later increased the
suspension to ten days.44
Furthermore, Woodland High School
maintained a policy which lowered “students’ grades by one letter grade
for each unexcused absence in excess of ten days.”45 Due to a
combination of prior unexcused absences and serving the suspension of
ten days, Brandon was failing all of his classes.46
[14] During trial, the Beussink court did not find “evidence of a
disturbance” because there was “only one other student in the room” when
Amanda showed Brandon’s website to the computer teacher and that
“student did not view the screen.”47 It was also determined that although
other students viewed the website on-campus the same day, the computer
teacher had “granted them permission to do so.”48 Applying the Tinker
standard, the Beussink court concluded that the school’s punishment of
Brandon violated his free speech rights under the First Amendment
because, even though students discussed the incident at school, Brandon’s
website did not substantially interfere with school administration.49
B. J.S. V. BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
[15] Justin Swidler, an eighth grader at Nitschmann Middle School in
Pennsylvania, also developed a website on his home computer during his
own time.50 Justin named the website “Teacher Sux.” It contained
extremely “derogatory, profane, offensive and threatening comments”

44

Id. at 1178-79.

45

Id. at 1179-80.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 1178.

48

Id.

49

See id. at 1180.

50

J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002).
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about both his algebra teacher, Mrs. Kathleen Fulmer, and his school’s
principal, Mr. A. Thomas Kartsotis.51 After creating the website, Justin
openly bragged about it and showed it to the other students at school.52
An anonymous e-mail subsequently reported the website to a teacher at
the school, who immediately informed the principal.53 At the end of the
school year, the school district expelled Justin permanently.54
[16] According to the record, after viewing the website Mrs. Fulmer
claimed that she sustained “stress, anxiety, loss of appetite, loss of sleep,
loss of weight, . . . short-term memory loss, . . . an inability to go out of
the house and mingle with crowds, . . . headaches and a general sense of
loss of well being,”55 rendering her temporarily incapable of fulfilling her
duties as a teacher.56 Her condition was so severe it required her to be
medicated57 and resulted in her taking medical leave for the entirety of the
following school year.58 Additionally, it was claimed that Justin’s website

51

Id. at 851. For example, one page on the website, stated that Mrs. Fulmer was a “bitch”
and should be fired for “show[ing] off her fat fucking legs.” J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). Elsewhere on the site, Justin combined
pictures of Mrs. Fulmer with images and quotes from the cartoon “South Park” which
said: “She’s a bigger bitch than your mom.” J.S., 807 A.2d at 851. “Yet another page
morphed a picture of Mrs. Fulmer’s face into that of Adolph Hitler and stated ‘The new
Fulmer Hitler movie. The similarities astound me.’” Id. More controversial pictures
depicted “Mrs. Fulmer with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck” and told
visitors to “take a look at the diagram and the reasons I gave, then give me $20 to help
pay for the hitman.” Id.
52

J.S., 807 A.2d at 852.

53

J.S., 757 A.2d at 415.

54

J.S., 807 A.2d at 853.

55

Id. at 852.

56

Id. at 869.

57

Id. at 852.

58

Id. at 869.
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“had a demoralizing impact on the school community.”59 According to
the principal, “the effect was worse than anything that he had encountered
in forty years of education.”60
[17] The J.S. court applied both the Fraser and Tinker standards,
ultimately finding in favor of the school.61 When applying the Fraser
standard, the court found that Justin’s “punishment for the use of lewd,
vulgar and plainly offensive language, including the personal attacks on
Mrs. Fulmer and Principal Kartsotis, fits easily within Fraser's upholding
of discipline for speech that undermines the basic function of a public
school.”62 Given Mrs. Fulmer’s impaired physical and mental health and
her absence, which “adversely impacted the educational environment,”
when applying Tinker, the court also determined that Justin’s punishment
comported with the First Amendment because his website caused a
substantial disruption to the operation of the school.63 Accordingly, the
court upheld the school district’s permanent expulsion with “little
difficulty.”64
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION STANDARD APPLIED TO
STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH
[18] Tinker’s substantial disruption standard is inadequate for student
Internet speech cases for two reasons. First, the standard is difficult to
apply because it provides little guidance to school officials to determine

59

Id. at 852.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 867-68.

62

Id. at 868.

63

Id. at 869.

64

Id.
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what constitutes a sufficient disruption to warrant school punishment.65
While most would agree that “[e]ducators should refrain from disciplining
students for creating webpages that fall on the relatively innocuous end of
the content spectrum,” without clearer standards it is difficult to determine
which types of student Internet speech “reach the level of harmfulness or
offensiveness that warrant school censorship.”66 Second, “the substantial
disruption test grants school officials and courts too much leeway to
restrict protected student speech,” and “the imprecision of the standard
threatens impermissibly to chill the speech of students who may fear that
their expression will lead to punishment.”67
[19] Contrasting Beussink and J.S. illustrates the difficulty in reaching a
consistent conclusion about what constitutes a substantial disruption. The
Beussink court, consistent with Tinker’s instruction that disliking or being
upset by the content of a student speech is not an acceptable justification
for limiting student speech, concluded that the school’s disciplinary
actions violated Brandon’s First Amendment rights because they were
based on the principal’s immediate distress upon seeing Brandon’s
website and not on a reasonable fear of disruption with school discipline.68
By also relying on Tinker, however, the J.S. court found the school’s
disciplinary actions did not violate Justin’s First Amendment rights

65

See Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REV. 625,
636-39 (1984).
66

Rhoda J. Yen, Free Speech on the Internet: Regulating Web Authorship by Students,
2000 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 61, 65 (2000) (“While such sites are obviously
distressing to those being targeted, they contain merely personal impressions and
opinions, which have traditionally been strongly protected under the First Amendment.”).

67

Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student Internet
Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 170 (2003).

68

Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d. 1175, 1180-82 (E.D. Mo.
1998).
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because the website disrupted the school by causing morale problems in
the school.69
[20] The J.S. court relied heavily on the principal’s testimony that
Justin’s website had a “demoralizing impact on the school community.”70
But the J.S. opinion is void of details of such an impact. In fact, it
indicates the lack thereof:
During this time, [Justin] continued to attend classes
and participate in extra-curricular activities, including a
band trip. The School District did not request that [Justin]
remove the site. Evidently, [Justin], on his own, removed
the web site approximately one week after [the principal]
became aware of the site. Moreover, the School District
took no action to confront or to punish [Justin] in any
manner during the remainder of the school year. Finally,
the School District did not refer [Justin] for any type of
psychological evaluation and did not request that his
parents have any such evaluation conducted.71
[21] A distinction between the two cases based on the negative effects
they had on the “listeners” cannot be drawn. Like Justin’s website, which
caused a viewer, Mrs. Fulmer, to complain of a plethora of physical and
psychological symptoms,72 Brandon’s website also had negative effects on
the computer teacher who saw his website.73 Upon reading the content of
Brandon’s website, the computer teacher became very upset and

69

J.S., 807 A.2d at 869. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court finding is consistent with that
of the Commonwealth Court. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 417
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).

70

J.S., 807 A.2d at 852.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1178.

12

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 2

immediately brought it to the attention of the principal.74 The principal
later testified that, when the computer teacher came to him, he could tell
by her demeanor and rapid speech that she was obviously agitated.75
Specifically, he believed the computer teacher was offended by Brandon’s
website.76 The principal himself was also distressed that other students
had viewed its content.77
[22] One may defend this inconsistency by arguing that Justin’s website
is more disruptive than Brandon’s because, while Brandon’s website
generally “convey[ed] his opinion regarding the teachers, the principal and
the school's own homepage,”78 Justin’s website specifically targeted his
math teacher, Mrs. Fulmer, and the principal, Mr. Kartsotis.79 Other
student Internet speech cases would not support such reasoning.
[23] For example, in Layschock v. Hermitage School District,80 a
Pennsylvania court found a high school lacked the authority for
disciplining a seventeen year-old student for creating an unflattering
“parody profile” of the principal on MySpace.81 The court concluded that
the school failed to establish a sufficient nexus “between [the student]’s
speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment.”82 In
another case, a Washington judge ruled in favor of a high school student
holding that a website ridiculing the assistant principal was not
74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 1177.

79

J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002).

80

496 F. Supp.2d 587, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007).

81

Id. at 601.

82

Id. at 600.
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substantially disruptive.83 In yet another case, an Ohio judge ordered the
reinstatement of a student who the school had suspended for creating a
webpage critical of his band teacher.84 Because the student created the
webpage at home, the school administrators admitted the punishment was
a mistake, and the case settled before trial.85 Commentators have
remarked, “[s]ites . . . which feature insults against a teacher, do not reach
the level of harmfulness or offensiveness that warrant school
censorship.”86 “While such sites are obviously distressing to those being
targeted, they contain merely personal impressions and opinions, which
have traditionally been strongly protected under the First Amendment.”87
[24] Arguably, without an actual threat to Mrs. Fulmer’s life, her
response to Justin’s website was neither rational nor foreseeable.88
Establishing a “standard of First Amendment protection on the reaction of
listeners threatens to abridge far more speech than is constitutionally
permissible.”89 Therefore, punishing students “anytime that a teacher is
upset by the magnitude and strength of the student's off-campus criticism”
only reduces the students’ freedom of speech.90

83

See Joshua Robin, Judge Upholds Student Who Posted Web Parody, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 19, 2000, at B5, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=20000719&slug=4032527. Among other things, Beidler allegedly placed
in phony ads for Viagra the superimposed images of the assistant principal having sex
with Homer Simpson, a television cartoon character. See id.

84

See Mark Rollenhagen, Westlake Schools to Pay $30,000 to Settle Net Suit, PLAIN
DEALER, Apr. 14, 1998, at 1A.
85

Id. O'Brien's webpage included a photo of his band teacher and characterized him as
“an overweight middle-age man who doesn't like to get haircuts.” Id.

86

Yen, supra note 66, at 65.

87

Id.

88

Tuneski, supra note 67, at 171.

89

Id. at 172.

90

Id. at 171-72.
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[25] By contrast, the Beussink court found Brandon’s discipline
impermissible because it was merely based on the principal’s distress upon
viewing Brandon’s website rather than a potential disruption to the
administration of the school.91 It has been argued that this conclusion,
however, is “not a question of law, but opinion.”92 As one scholar has
noted, it is not the reaction to the content of a website that matters, “but
rather to its disruptive effect on the effective governance of the school
environment.”93
[26] Knowledge of the Internet speech on the part of school members
does not explain why the Beussink court concluded that “classes are not
materially or substantially disrupted” while the J.S. court found the
contrary.94 As in J.S., students, faculty, and administrators at Brandon’s
school were all aware of his website.95 Arguably, the disruption arose in
Beussink when students viewing Brandon’s website were instructed to
leave the site.96 After all, “minor attention problems in classrooms [have]
been considered . . . substantial disruption.”97 In fact, “nearly any
controversial or offensive expression that stirs debate or humors students

91

See Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp.2d. 1175, 1182 (E.D. Mo.
1998).

92

Louis John Seminski, Jr., Note, Tinkering With Student Free Speech: The Internet and
the Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 177 (2001).
93

Id.

94

Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1178.

95

Compare Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d. at 1177-78 (describing how Beussink allowed
various people to use his home computer and showed the homepage website), with J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 851-52 (Pa. 2002) (“[S]tudents, faculty and
administrators of [J.S.’s school] viewed the web site.”).
96

Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1179.

97

Tuneski, supra note 67, at 172; see, e.g., Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F.
Supp. 517, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (finding poor student attention in class caused by the
reading of the off-campus newspaper, “Oink,” was a substantial disruption).
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could cause enough of a classroom interruption to satisfy the substantial
disruption test.”98
[27] A review of J.S., Beussink, and other relevant case law shows that
the substantial disruption standard, being indefinite, vague, flexible, and
easily satisfied, can be used by overzealous school officials to justify
punishing students for a wide array of their expression, even those that
occurred off-campus. Furthermore, this standard provides courts with
wide discretion with which to manipulate the standard to reach a desired
conclusion. As noted by one scholar, whether or not courts abuse this
discretion, “applying the substantial disruption test to off-campus speech
threatens to abridge speech” rights in “otherwise fully protected forums.”99
B. THE LEWDNESS STANDARD APPLIED TO STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH
[28] The lewdness standard set out by Fraser has not proven to be
dispositive for deciding student Internet speech cases. While the J.S. court
found it permissible for the school to restrict Justin’s Internet speech
because it was lewd and offensive,100 the Beussink court found it
impermissible for the school to restrict Brandon’s Internet speech, even
though it was similarly “crude and vulgar.”101 Not only is it difficult to
decipher from the record that Justin’s website is, as a matter of law, more
vulgar than Brandon’s, but the J.S. court may have exceeded Fraser’s
lewdness standard “by applying the rationale to speech originating away
from school or a school-sponsored event.”102

98

Tuneski, supra note 67, at 173.

99

Id. at 170-72.

100

J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 867-68 (Pa. 2002).

101

Beussink, 30 F. Supp.2d at 1177.

102

Robert E. Simpson, Jr., Limits on Students' Speech in the Internet Age, 105 DICK. L.
REV. 181, 195 (2001).
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C. THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM STANDARD APPLIED TO
STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH
[29] As alluded to above, Kuhlmeier’s school curriculum standard is
difficult to apply to student speech that occurs on the Internet.103 The
difficulty lies in the amorphous distinction between on-campus and offcampus student speech. While the Beussink court avoided addressing the
issue of whether a website that was created on a home computer outside of
school hours but viewed at school is an “on-campus” speech, the trial
court in J.S., the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, found it “evident
that the courts have allowed school officials to discipline students for
conduct occurring off of school premises where it is established that the
conduct materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process.”104 And yet, the appellate court in J.S., the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, found “a sufficient nexus between [Justin’s] web site and
the school campus” because Justin’s website was “aimed at a specific
school and/or its personnel [and] brought onto the school campus or
accessed at school by its originator.”105 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

103

See supra Part I.C.

104

J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 421(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).

105

J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
[T]he record clearly reflects that the off-campus web site was
accessed by J.S. at school and was shown to a fellow student. While it
is less certain exactly what portions of the web site the student viewed,
J.S., nevertheless, facilitated the on-campus nature of the speech by
accessing the web site on a school computer in a classroom, showing
the site to another student, and by informing other students at school of
the existence of the web site. Related thereto, faculty members and the
school administration also accessed the web site at school. Importantly,
the web site was aimed not at a random audience, but at the specific
audience of students and others connected with this particular School
District; Mrs. Fulmer and [the principal] were the subjects of the site.

See id. at 864 n.11 (noting that “purely off-campus speech may . . . be subject to
punishment by [the] school district if [the substantial disruption test] of Tinker [is]
satisfied.”).
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therefore determined it was “inevitable” that a website created off-campus
“would pass from students to teachers” on-campus.106 Without a clearer
distinction between what constitutes on-campus and off-campus speech,
courts will continue to be divided.
D. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION
[30] Student Internet speech jurisprudence has two “spins”: the Internet
spin and the school spin. On the one hand, by focusing only on the
Internet spin, one would argue that student Internet speech, being Internet
speech all the same, is protected by the First Amendment under Reno.107
On the other hand, by focusing only on the school spin, one would argue
that student Internet speech, being student speech all the same, is subject
to regulation by the school under Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.
[31] But those who see the Internet as a technological advance in
communication, offering an “opportunity for robust, uninhibited selfexpression”108 would argue that students’ expression over the Internet,
whether it be “cathartic expressions of their frustrations or artistic
sensibilities,” should be protected by the First Amendment because the
Internet is editor-less, interactive, and allows for students to express their
views and ideas anonymously without fear of an “official retaliation,
social ostracism, [or] an invasion of privacy.”109 Some commentators
argue that First Amendment protections “must necessarily extend” to
student expression over the Internet to “ensure every citizen of his or her

106

Id. at 865.

107

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).

108

Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The
First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1996).
109

Sandy S. Li, Comment, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued
Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 93-94 (2005).
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individual rights and to foster the growth and improvement of our
government and society.”110
[32] If schools can prohibit students from making substantially
disruptive and/or lewd speech on-campus or in a school newspaper, they
should similarly be able to impose their discretion on student speech on
the Internet that has a foreseeable disruptive effect on campus ground.
Given that dissemination of information on the Internet is both immediate
and pervasive, an e-mail, a website, or a blog could potentially create
more disturbance on school grounds than can a conversation between two
students in the school cafeteria. If schools do not need to “tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with [their] basic educational mission” oncampus or in a school newspaper, then it makes little sense to require
schools to tolerate student speech that occurred in a different and more
injurious forum.111
[33] Courts have resorted to the “off-campus” defense to counter this
argument.112 The “off-campus” defense assumes that student Internet
speech is off-campus speech and, therefore, should be subject to a higher
level of First Amendment protection.113
[34] Because the Supreme Court has never articulated standards
regarding how much authority a school may assert over off-campus
student expression, however, a lack of guidance has led to inconsistent
conclusions among the lower courts. On one end of the campus property
spectrum, some courts have concluded that “school officials are powerless

110

Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, For Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV.
101, 124-25 (1997).

111

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (citing Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)) (holding that the school did not violate
the student’s First Amendment rights by censoring his articles on the student newspaper
because it was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns).
112

See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050-51
(1979).

113

Id.
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to impose sanctions for expression” that occurred off of school
property.114 On the other end of the spectrum, some courts115 have
concluded that “when the bounds of decency are violated in publications
distributed to high school students, whether on campus or off campus, the
offenders become subject to discipline.”116 But scholars have warned that
such conclusions are overreaching by granting schools the authority to
discipline students who create websites at home.117
[35] There are also those who are somewhere in the middle of this
campus property spectrum. These scholars suggest scrutinizing the
physical location of the computer or server receiving the Internet speech118

114

Id. at 1050 n.13; see Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1090
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (characterizing the student’s website as having an “out-of-school
nature” and granting a temporary restraining order in favor of the student).

115

See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding the school’s
punishment based on a student’s blog which was created off-campus to be permissible
because the blog contained the “sort of language that properly may be prohibited in
schools” and (b) the blog would “‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school.’” (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1969))); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp.2d 446, 459 (W.D.
Pa. 2001) (holding that whether a student speech is on-campus or off-campus should be
analyzed in accordance with Tinker’s substantial disruption standard).
116

Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 526 (C.D. Cal. 1969)
(emphasis added); see Doninger, 527 F.3d at 54 (finding the school’s punishment based
on a student’s blog which was created off-campus to be permissible); Killion, 136 F.
Supp.2d at 459; Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 772 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (finding that
calling a teacher a lewd name in a public place subjected the student to discipline by the
school authorities).
117

Simpson, supra note 102, at 194.

118

Yen, supra note 66, at 68 (“Sites created on private servers, and on privately-owned
computers at home, deserve a high degree of protection from censorship. Conversely,
schools should retain discretion in regulating webpages created on school property, on
school accounts, or with school computers.”); cf. Killion, 136 F. Supp.2d 459 (applying
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard without resolving whether an email that was
created off-campus but printed and carried on school grounds by others was an oncampus or off-campus speech).
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or the foreseeability of an Internet speech reaching the school119 to
determine whether or not student Internet speech is on-campus or offcampus.
[36] One solution “to protect the First Amendment rights of students,
courts should establish a clear rule that off-campus speech is not subject to
the jurisdiction of school officials.”120 To make this restriction effective, a
clear line must be drawn between on-campus and off-campus speech.121
Rather than focus on the physical place of reception of a website or an email or how foreseeable it is that the Internet speech would arrive on
school grounds, courts should focus on the student author’s role in
publicizing or disseminating the website to demarcate the reach of
schools’ authority.122 “By taking this additional step, a speaker decides
whether she wishes to subject herself to the jurisdiction of school
officials.”123 “Such steps would include opening a web page at school,
telling others to view the site from school, distributing a [printed version]
as students enter school, and sending e-mail to school accounts.”124 By
contrast, merely posting a website or comments on the Internet would be a
passive act that is insufficient for categorization as on-campus speech that
is subject to a school’s censorship. “If the author does not take steps to
encourage the dissemination at school, it can be presumed that the author

119

See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th
Cir. 1998) (affirming the expulsion of a student for writing an article in an underground
newspaper that provided instructions on how to hack into the school's computers since
there was a reasonable likelihood of a punishable substantial disruption).
120

Tuneski, supra note 67, at 177.

121

Id.

122

Yen, supra note 66, at 77 (“A student who aggressively disseminates the website's
existence and content to other students, thereby intentionally causing a school
disturbance, may be subject to different standards of restraint and discipline than a
student who privately creates a website without publicizing it at school”); see Tuneski,
supra note 67, at 187.
123

Tuneski, supra note 67, at 177.

124

Id. at 178.
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intended the speech which originated off-campus to be viewed and
received off-campus.”125
[37] Finally, prohibiting schools from punishing students for their
strictly off-campus speech would not turn schools into “madhouses of
chaos” because alternative means of regulating student speech within
schools are sufficient to maintain the proper order and decorum of the
learning environment.126 For example, the Supreme Court recognizes that
the Fourteenth Amendment gives parents a broad power in the “care,
custody, and management of [their] children.”127 Of course, there are
always the threats of civil and criminal prosecutions to keep the
miscreants in line too.128
CONCLUSION
[38] As the Internet is now an essential part of the everyday lives of
students, more and more student speech cases that the lower courts are
dealing with today involve Internet speech. Yet, the three pre-Internet
standards of Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier set out by the Supreme Court
have proven to be inadequately vague for this new and unique medium of
communication.
[39] Drawing a bright line between on-campus speech and Internet
speech would provide better guidelines for courts and school officials on
the scope of the First Amendment. It is suggested that courts should focus
on the role of the student author of that Internet speech in disseminating
the content of that speech on-campus to determine whether a student
speech that occurred on the Internet is subject to the school’s discretion. If

125

Id. at 177-78.

126

Id. at 180-81. See generally Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus
Punishment: Censorship of the Merging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
243 (2001) (discussing student speech and school methods of punishment).

127
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787 (1982) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
128

See Tuneski, supra note 67, at 142; Calvert, supra note 126, at 261.
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a student takes a purposeful step to direct their speech towards the school,
then that student’s speech should be subject to the school’s jurisdiction.
[40] Punishing students for the e-mails or websites they created offcampus during their own time poses an intolerable threat to the First
Amendment rights of students. Such a threat cannot be justified by the
need to maintain order in the schools as there are alternative methods to
punish offensive speech and deter school disruptions.
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